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Torts 
by John A. Gorfinkel* 
"Torts" has become a convenient label for a wide variety 
of wrongs redressed through civi1litigation. During the year 
being reviewed, the California courts touched on almost every 
conceivable phase of this subject. However, the space al-
lotted does not permit even a cursory treatment of all the 
decisions that might be regarded as pertinent or significant. 
The discussion which follows is therefore limited and, in so 
limiting it, we have tried to emphasize those areas where the 
decisions indicate either that change may be taking place, 
or is needed. 
Medical Malpractice and Res Ipsa Loquitur 
One of the most significant developments has been the 
increasing approval of res ipsa loquitur instructions in medical 
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malpractice cases. Two decisions, Clark v. Gibbonsl and 
Tomei v. Henning,2 are particularly important. In order to 
appreciate their potential, some review of the earlier cases is 
necessary. 
In a medical malpractice case, negligence consists of failure 
to possess or use the degree of care and skill common to the 
medical profession in the geographic area.s This standard 
was long regarded as a matter requiring expert testimony; 
the common knowledge of the jury could not furnish the 
standard and could not permit an inference of negligence from 
an unfortunate or unsatisfactory result.4 Accordingly, res 
ipsa loquitur had no place in such cases. 
The first applications of res ipsa loquitur to medical mal-
practice were in cases where the injury affected a part of the 
body remote from and unconnected with the area of treat-
ment, or resulted from the presence of a foreign body in the 
operative area. Classical instances were the burn from a 
hot water bottIe,5 the traumatic injury to a shoulder during 
an abdominal operation,6 and the surgical sponge left in the 
patient's abdomen after an operation.7 In such cases, one 
of the elements necessary for res ipsa loquitur was present-
the resulting injury was of such a nature that it could be 
said, in the light of ordinary experience and without the in-
tervention of expert testimony, that it was more probably 
than not the result of someone's negligence. But when the 
injury occurred during a procedure or course of treatment 
administered by several persons, the other element, that it 
was more probably than not the negligence of any particular 
defendant, was absent. Ybarra v. Spangard8 had held, how-
ever, that this did not preclude the application of the doctrine; 
1. 66 Cal.2d 399, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125, breIl v. Suburban Hosp., 4 Cal.2d 68, 
426 P.2d 525 (1967). 47 P.2d 737 (1935). 
2. 67 Cal.2d 318, 62 Cal. Rptr. 9, 431 6. Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 
P.2d 633 (1967). 486, 154 P.2d 687, 162 AL.R. 1258 
3. See, e.g., Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal.2d (1944). 
749, 205 P.2d 3, 8 AL.R.2d 757 (1949). 7. See 38 Cal. Jur.2d, Physicians, etc. 
4. 38 Cal. Jur.2d Physicians, etc. § 96 § 98 at 728, 730 and cases cited therein. 
(1957). 8. 25 Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d 687, 162 
5. See, e.g., Trindle v. Wheeler, 23 AL.R. 1258 (1944). 
Cal.2d 330, 143 P.2d 932 (1943); Tim-
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if the patient, because of his condition during the treatment, 
could not determine when, or at whose hands, the injury was 
received, the burden of initial explanation was placed on the 
defendants. Ybarra was followed by Leonard v. Watsonville 
Community Hospita? and the doctrine was established that 
if an inference of negligence could be drawn from the fact 
of injury during an operation, then every person having con-
trol over the patient's body or the instrumentality causing the 
injury during the period involved was called upon to meet 
that inference by explanation of his conduct. 
The next step, and the one involved in the current cases, 
is the extension of res ipsa loquitur to injuries of such a 
nature that common experience does not furnish a guide. 
Here the landmark is Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital. 10 
In Quintal the patient suffered a cardiac arrest during the 
administration of a general anaesthetic. Common knowl-
edge alone could supply no basis for an inference of want 
of care on anyone's part. Medical experts testified that 
cardiac arrest, although a rare occurrence, was a known and 
calculated risk of giving a general anaesthetic, that it seldom 
occurred when due care was used, but when it did occur it 
could not be said that it was more likely than not the result 
of negligence. There was also some evidence of specific acts 
indicating want of due care on the part of the attending 
doctors. Given this state of the record, a sharply divided 
court approved the giving of a conditional res ipsa loquitur 
instruction. This conditional form of the instruction per-
mitted the jury to apply res ipsa loquitur if it found that the 
injury was one that would not have occurred but for some-
one's negligence; in effect the jury first determined whether 
there was a basis for the application of res ipsa loquitur, and 
if it found such a basis, applied the doctrine. Twice during 
the year under review, the supreme court again considered 
this specific problem. 
In Clark v. Gibbons,ll the defendants were the attending 
surgeon and anaesthesiologist. The operation was for the 
9. 47 Ca1.2d 509, 305 P.2d 36 (1956). 11.66 Ca1.2d 399, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125, 
10. 62 Cal.2d 154, 41 Cal. Rptr. 577, 426 P.2d 525 (1967). 
397 P.2d 161 (1964). 
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reduction of a severe ankle fracture. The anaesthetic wore 
off prior to the completion of the operation, the operation 
was prematurely terminated and plaintiff, as a result, sus-
tained permanent limitation in the ankle. The court's opinion 
recites testimony from which the jury could have found specific 
acts of negligence. The surgeon and anaesthesiologist had 
not communicated with each other concerning the anticipated 
length of the operation; the former estimated a procedure 
of two to three hours while the latter assumed the operation 
would last two hours and administered a spinal anaesthetic 
capable, in a normal patient, of lasting two hours, plus or 
minus fifteen minutes. The anaesthetic wore off in about 
one hour. There was evidence that, at the point the original 
anaesthetic wore off, further anaesthesia could have been 
given without harm to the patient. There was testimony that 
in any spinal anaesthetic there is inherent risk, even when due 
care is used, that the anaesthesia will not last as long as con-
templated due to peculiarities in the physical condition of the 
patient, but there was also testimony that if proper care were 
used, the anaesthetic should not wear off before completion 
of the operation. 
It seems clear, from the testimony narrated by the court, 
that the jury could have found specific acts of negligence from 
the failure of the team to communicate, from the failure to 
administer an anaesthetic adequate for the procedures con-
templated, or from the decision to terminate rather than ex-
tend the anaesthetic. But the problem before the supreme 
court was that the trial court had given the conditional instruc-
tion of res ipsa loquitur. 
A majority of four justices, in an opinion by Justice Peters, 
affirmed;12 the Chief Justice and Justice Tobriner concurred 
in the result in separate opinions differing substantially from 
each other and from the majority; and Justice McComb dis-
sented. The majority relied primarily on the Quintal de-
cision and approved the giving of the conditional instruction 
in these words: 
12. The Justices concurring in the Justice Peek; Associate Justice Sullivan 
majority opinion were Associate Justices did not sit. 
Mosk and Burke and Retired Associate 
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Thus, we recognized in Quintal that proof that when 
due care is exercised an injury rarely occurs, accom-
panied by other evidence indicating negligence, may be 
sufficient to warrant an instruction on conditional res 
ipsa loquitur. . This is particularly true where, 
as in Quintal and in the present case, the injury occurred 
as the result of a normal procedure such as the adminis-
tration of an anesthetic, rather than from a complex 
operation. . . . 
The likelihood of a negligent cause is increased if 
the low incidence of accidents when due care is used is 
combined with proof of specific acts of negligence of a 
type which could have caused the occurrence complained 
of. When those two facts are proved, the likelihood of 
a negligent cause may be sufficiently great that the jury 
may properly conclude that the accident was more prob-
ably than not the result of someone's negligence.13 
The logic of this approach seems strained. It permits 
the addition of two separate factors to produce a third which 
is not necessarily the sum of the two. The happening of the 
event is one factor; assuming that such an event does not 
normally occur when due care is used, the event, standing 
alone, does not warrant the giving of the instruction. The 
evidence concerning specific acts which could be found to 
be a failure to exercise due care is the other factor; these 
events, standing alone, justify a finding of negligence but 
do not warrant the giving of the instruction. How, then, does 
the combination of the two permit the jury to infer negli-
gence from a cause other than the specific acts of the de-
fendants? This may be tested by posing a hypothetical situ-
ation, based on facts only slightly different from Clark v. 
Gibbons. Would the court have approved the giving of a res 
ipsa loquitur instruction if the defendants in that case had 
agreed upon the approximate length of the operation as three 
hours and then, although the anaesthetic administered was 
13. 66 Ca1.2d at 412, 413, 58 Cal. 
Rptr. at 134, 426 P.2d at 534 (emphasis 
added). 
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normally adequate for the anticipated time, were forced to 
terminate the operation when it wore off prematurely because 
of an explainable (i. e., the patient was atypical) cause? 
The facts thus assumed would negative the indicia of specific 
acts of negligence recited in the majority opinion, but the 
other aspect of that opinion-"the low incidence of accidents 
when due care is used"-would remain. If this latter factor 
alone is sufficient to warrant the giving of the instruction in 
a case of this character, the criticisms of those not joining in 
the majority opinion seems justified. Their view, briefly stated, 
was that conceding that the premature wearing-off of the 
anaesthetic was a rare occurrence, the instruction could not 
be justified unless there was something to show that when 
it does occur it is more probably than not the result of negli-
gence on the part of some member of the surgical team. The 
use of evidence of other possibly negligent conduct to rein-
force the reliance on res ipsa loquitur was cogently criticized 
by the Chief Justice: 
Nor does evidence of specific acts of negligence justify 
an inference of negligence based on res ipsa loquitur, 
for the inferences the jury may reasonably draw from 
the happening of the accident alone obviously cannot 
be determined by evidence of the defendant's conduct.14 
The most challenging approach to the problem was that 
suggested by Justice Tobriner in his concurring opinion. He 
carefully established the unreliability of a statistical approach 
to the use of res ipsa loquitur in this class of case, and urged 
that such cases not be forced into the mold of negligence and 
fault, with concomitant straining of doctrine and stigmatizing 
of practitioners: 
If public policy demands that defendants be held 
responsible for unexplained accidents without a reasoned 
finding of fault, such responsibility should be fixed openly 
and uniformly, not under the guise of negligence and 
at the discretion of a jury. 
14. 66 Cal.2d at 422, 58 Cal. Rptr. 
at 141, 426 P.2d at 541. 
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I must conclude that, in this limited category of cases, 
the attempt to fix liability exclusively in terms of tradi-
tional notions of fault has outlived its utility. Once it 
appears that an unexplained surgical accident has caused 
an unexpected injury, no useful end is advanced by re-
hearsing the ancient ritual of assessing blame.15 
Five months after Clark v. Gibbons, in Tomei v. Henningl6 
the supreme court, in a unanimous opinion by the Chief 
Justice, reversed the trial court for failing to give a conditional 
res ipsa loquitur instruction in a medical malpractice case. 
This rather quick shift from disagreement and dissent to uni-
formity and harmony bespeaks either a substantial difference 
in facts between the two cases, or a substantial change in at-
titude on the part of those who did not join with the majority 
in Clark v. Gibbons. 
It is difficult to find a substantial basis for factual differenti-
ation. In Tomei the defendant, a surgeon, accidentally 
sutured plaintiff's right ureter in two places during a hyster-
ectomy. This was not discovered for four days; corrective 
surgery failed and plaintiff's right kidney had to be removed. 
Medical experts testified that there is considerable risk in-
volving the ureters during a hysterectomy, that surgeons try 
to stay away from them, that the urinary tract can be damaged 
no matter how careful the surgeon's actions, and that there are 
procedures, before closing the abdomen, for testing the con-
dition of the ureters. The court's opinion was brief. It held 
that the conditional res ipsa loquitur instruction should have 
been given since the medical testimony afforded reasonable 
support for an inference of negligence. 
But this result appears to be the same "boot-strapping" 
technique so severely criticized by the Chief Justice in Clark 
v. Gibbons. The medical testimony was such that the jury 
could have found specific acts of negligence, either in tying 
off the ureter in two places, or in closing the abdominal 
cavity without using any technique to determine the condition 
of the ureters. Nevertheless the jury had returned a verdict 
15. 66 Cal.2d at 416, 421, 58 Cal. 16. 67 Cal.2d 318, 62 Cal. Rptr. 9, 
Rptr. at 137, 140,426 P.2d at 537, 540. 431 P.2d 633 (1967). 
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in the defendant's favor. Under these circumstances, de-
fendant's counsel contended that any res ipsa loquitur instruc-
tion would have been superfluous. His argument was that the 
evidence had pointed to particular conduct and had character-
ized it as potentially negligent; if the jury did not find negli-
gence on that basis, how could it conceivably have used the 
same testimony as a basis to infer negligence under the res 
ipsa loquitur instruction? Counse1's argument seemed un-
assailable, but not so, said the court: 
We do not believe, however, that a res ipsa loquitur 
instruction would have been superfluous in this case. 
It would have focused consideration on the inferences 
that could be drawn from the happening of the accident 
itself as distinct from the inferences that could be drawn 
from the evidence of the specific procedures available 
to a surgeon to avoid suturing a ureter or to discover 
such suturing in time to correct it before closing the 
wound. Properly instructed, the jury could 
pursue the answer to that question along two distinct 
routes. It could ask what did defendant do or fail to 
do that might have caused the accident. Under a res 
ipsa loquitur instruction. [the jury] could ask 
whether it is more likely than not that when such an 
accident occurs, the surgeon was negligent. . . . Had 
the instruction been given, however, the jury might 
reasonably have concluded that regardless of how the 
accident happened or how it could have been avoided, 
its happening alone supported an inference of negli-
gence.17 
Under the facts of this particular case, the court is saying 
that even though the testimony of the medical experts did not 
convince the jury that the surgeon failed to use reasonable 
care when he accidentally sutured the ureter, or when he 
closed the abdomen without checking the ureters, the jury 
could still find on some other undisclosed basis that the sur-
geon would not have sutured the ureter if he had used reason-
17. 67 Cal.2d at 322, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 
12, 431 P.2d at 636. 
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able care. And this, it is submitted, is the very proposition 
that Justice Tobriner protested against so strenuously in his 
concurring opinion in Clark, and to which the Chief Justice 
objected in that case and in his dissent in Quintal. There 
seems no valid basis for distinction between Clark and Tomei. 
The unanimity in Tomei can be explained only as an accept-
ance by the entire court of the majority opinions in Quintal 
and in Clark. But the concurring opinion of Justice Tobriner 
still, it is submitted, rings true. This is not res ipsa loquitur 
and it is not negligence; it is public policy placing the obliga-
tion of explanation on the defense and permitting the jury, in 
its almost uncontrolled discretion, to impose liability if there is 
any evidence of negligence plus any indication of an unusual 
or rare occurrence. 
What is Harm-Liability for Unwanted Pregnancy 
Custodio v. Bauer18 is the first California case to consider 
whether an unwanted pregnancy is a legally cognizable harm. 
Plaintiffs were husband and wife, and the parents of nine 
children. Defendants had performed a sterilization operation 
on the plaintiff wife but within a year thereafter she again 
became pregnant. The complaint stated several causes of 
action, including counts for negligence in performance of the 
operation, negligence in failing to apprise plaintiffs of the 
possible ineffectiveness thereof, negligent and intentional mis-
representation as to the efficacy of the operation, and breach 
of contract. 
The trial court sustained defendants' demurrers without 
leave to amend; the court of appeal reversed, holding that 
each of the several counts contained allegations sufficient to 
state a cause of action.19 The opinion is particularly signifi-
cant in holding that statements as to the effect of an operation, 
while matters of opinion, may be sufficient for an action in 
deceit or negligent misrepresentation, and for the view that 
an express agreement to perform a sterilization operation 
may place the surgeon in the position of a warrantor. 20 
18. 251 Cal. App.2d 303, 59 Cal. remedies were not considered at this 
Rptr. 463 (1967). stage of the case. 
19. Possible problems of election of 20. Since the case, in its present 
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The immediate thrust of the OpInIOn is two-fold. The 
first is that sterilization, for personal as well as therapeutic 
purposes, does not offend public policy and therefore an 
action may be maintained for an ineffective operation. 
The second is more far-reaching. Having determined that 
causes of action were stated, the court considered the question 
of the "harm" for which damages could be recovered. Since 
these questions arose under the pleadings, the court was 
understandably reluctant, in advance of any evidence on the 
issues of liability and damages, to be specific on the items 
for which recovery could be had. However, some fairly 
clear guidelines were indicated. Thus the court approved 
the propriety of damages for the costs of the unsuccessful 
operation and for any physical or mental suffering or com-
plications that might result from the operation or the un-
wanted pregnancy. The court also included in the area of 
compensable damage, any loss that the present members of 
the family would sustain in having the care, love, and support 
of the parents spread over a larger number. To the extent 
that such loss could be economically measured, it should, 
said the court, be compensable. 
Plaintiffs had also requested damages for the rearing of 
the child. The court did not deal directly with this issue 
which raises the most perplexing problems of public policy, 
liability and damages. Since it is hardly arguable that a 
child in our society is anything other than an economic liability 
to his family, should the expenses of his upbringing be treated 
any differently from the expenses of his birth? To what 
extent should the economic status of the family be con-
sidered? Or the benefit conferred on the family in love and 
companionship? Is the direction that the law may take to 
be inferred from the growing social acceptance of contra-
ception as a means to economic betterment of the family 
unit? If we accept the principle that a family may be better 
off, emotionally and financially, if it remains small, then 
perhaps our courts are prepared to hold that a child who is 
posture, is concerned with allegations necessary to establish either a misrepre-
and not with facts, it would appear sentation or a warranty or breach of 
premature to comment on the evidence contract claim. 
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conceived after an operation intended to limit the size of 
the family is a legally cognizable "harm" and the doctor, if 
negligent, may be held liable for the economic and social 
"detriment" thereby caused the other members of the family. 
Negligence-Problems of Duty and Causation 
It is traditional "black-letter" law that before an actor 
can be held liable for the consequences of careless conduct, 
his conduct must have "caused" the injury. And it is also 
"black-letter" law that the problems of "causation" present 
two separate questions, cause in fact, and scope of liability 
for the more remote or less likely consequences of the actor's 
conduct, sometimes called "proximate cause." Unfortunately, 
the language of causation in California decisions has been 
replete with confusion between "cause in fact" and "proximate 
cause." This in turn has tended to prevent a clear analysis 
of what "proximate cause" is or should be. During the past 
year, several cases were decided in which one or both issues 
were presented with the mixed result that in some decisions 
cause in fact and proximate cause were used interchangeably, 
to add to the confusion,l while in other decisions courts 
avoided the ambiguous language of causation and carefully 
analyzed the problem in terms of the scope of duty and the 
nature of the risk created by the actor's conduct. 
It is hoped that the analysis and discussion that follow, by 
focusing attention on these matters, may help in clearing 
away a part of the semantic jungle that covers a good part 
of this subject. 
Cause in Fact-"Proximate Cause" Misused 
"Cause in fact" should be used to refer to that act or event, 
without which the result would not have followed. Unless 
it can be said that "but for" the act of the defendant the 
1. On the credit side, a brief ac-
knowledgment to the court of appeal 
opinion in WalIer v. Southern Pacific 
Co. (54 Cal. Rptr. 421, 427, 3d Dist., 
11/11 66, vacated on other grounds, 66 
Cal.2d 201, 57 Cal. Rptr. 353, 424 P.2d 
937) for its clear and concise statement 
12 
of the distinction between cause in fact 
and proximate cause. See also FulIer v. 
Standard Stations, Inc., 250 Cal. App.2d 
687, 58 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1967), discussed 
intra under Duty to Whom and Nature 
of Risk. 
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result would not have followed, or alternatively, that the act 
of the defendant was a substantial factor in producing the 
result, cause in fact is not established. Assume a safety 
order requiring a full stop, prior to entering the crossing, by 
all trains crossing highways at grade from industrial sidings. 
A IOO-car freight train, loaded with gravel, enters the cross-
ing without coming to a full stop. It has violated the law 
and such violation will, in most jurisdictions, be treated as 
negligence per se; but if a motorist runs into the IOOth car 
of that train, it can hardly be said that the train's failure 
to stop had anything to do with the collision. Thus the viola-
tion is not a cause in fact. On the other hand, proximate 
cause, correctly used, must initially assume that the defend-
ant's act was a cause in fact, and then proceed to determine 
whether the defendant should be held liable for the particular 
consequences of the act. The distinction between cause in 
fact and proximate cause is thus essentially between a factual 
concept, and a legal concept. A defendant leaves his auto-
mobile unattended, with the keys in the car and the motor 
running; a juvenile delinquent borrows the car and in his 
ensuing joyride injures the plaintiff. The defendant's con-
duct is a substantial factor, a cause in fact, a setting in motion 
of the chain of events leading to injury. Whether he should 
be held liable is a policy consideration, usually subsumed 
under the rubric "proximate cause" although sometimes 
treated as a question of the scope of the duty owed by the 
defendant to the injured party or whether the eventual harm 
was within the risk created by the defendant's act. If the 
foregoing seems unduly elementary, its justification lies in 
the three decisions about to be discussed. 
In DeArmond v. Southern Pacific CO.,2 plaintiffs were 
guests in a motor vehicle and sued the railroad for injuries 
received in a grade crossing collision between the motor 
vehicle and defendant's train. The negligence of the driver 
of the motor vehicle was conceded. The trial court, sitting 
without a jury, found that the driver's negligence was the 
"sole proximate cause" of the accident. Plaintiffs appealed, 
2. 253 Cal. App.2d 732, 61 Cal. Rptr. 
844 (1967). 
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claiming that the railroad was also negligent in that it had 
failed to sound the whistle at the precise distance required 
by statute. The evidence indicated that numerous signals 
and warnings had been given and that a wigwag crossing 
signal, with red light, was in continuous operation from the 
time when the driver was still more than 200 feet from the 
crossing. Under these circumstances, the appellate court 
viewed the trial court's findings as in effect holding that if 
there were a violation of statute, such violation was not the 
"proximate" cause of plaintiff's injuries. There is no doubt 
about the correctness of the result. If the driver did not 
see the train's headlight and the red light and the flashing wig-
wag, and did not hear a warning bell and a whistle, all when he 
still had ample time to stop, then the failure to blow a whistle 
a few feet further back from the crossing could not have 
changed the result. Hence the failure to sound the whistle 
at the precise point required by law was not a substantial or 
any factor in producing the end result. The error lies in 
the injection of that Ubiquitous adjective "proximate" into 
the opinion where it does not belong. 
In Hazelwood v. Gordon,3 plaintiff fell down a flight of 
steps. It was claimed that the stairs did not conform to 
applicable safety ordinances, but apparently the only defects 
which existed were the absence of a handrail and the odd 
width of the bottom tread. But plaintiff lost her balance on 
the top step. To quote the court: "The violations of ordi-
nances she alleged pertained to the hand-rail and to lower 
steps. . . . Such testimony supports findings both of lack 
of proximate cause for appellant's injuries, and of her contrib-
utory negligence.,,4 It is clear, from the court's narration, 
that whatever defects there were had nothing to do with 
plaintiff's injuries; had the stairs been constructed strictly in 
accord with code and safety requirements, the fall and in-
juries would have been the same. It is equally clear, that 
if there were any connection, in tact, between the defect in 
the stairs and plaintiff's fall, then the injuries were within 
the risk to be guarded against, and the defect would have 
3. 253 Cal. App.2d 216, 61 Cal. Rptr. 4. 253 Cal. App.2d at 219, 61 Cal. 
115 (1967). Rptr. at 117 (emphasis added). 
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been both the cause in fact and the proximate cause of the 
injuries. Again, the result is sound, the adjective "proximate" 
misplaced. 
In Espinoza v. Rossini,5 plaintiff was riding on, and not in, 
a motor vehicle in a manner that may have been in violation 
of Vehicle Code section 21712. The evidence indicated that 
he would have been injured to the same extent had he been 
riding in the vehicle. "[W]hether this negligence," said the 
court, "contributed as a proximate cause to his injury was a 
question of fact for the jury to decide."6 Once again the word 
"proximate" is misused and its use is confusing. The issue 
was whether plaintiff's conduct, if negligent, was a factor in 
causing his injury, and this was an issue of cause in fact 
and not proximate cause. 
Proximate Cause, So-called, and Nature and Scope of Duty 
Given an act that is careless and a resulting injury to a 
plaintiff, the issue may then arise whether the actor should 
be held liable for injury of this type or to this particular 
plaintiff. Frequently the problem arises because of the activi-
ties of other parties operating in the interval between defend-
ant's conduct and plaintiff's injury, and the terms "interven-
ing" and "supervening" cause are used. Sometimes the 
problem arises without any third-party activity, but the result 
is an unforeseeable type of harm or an injury to an unfore-
seeable plaintiff. . 
These are the problems usually subsumed under the concept 
of proximate cause; while that term is not inherently meaning-
ful or helpful, if it is to be used at all it should be limited to 
that concept. 
Several cases considered problems of this type during the 
year; these cases are significant both in their approach to 
the problem and in the results reached. 
In their approach to the problem of scope of liability, 
several decisions abandoned the language of proximate cause 
and analyzed the issues in terms of the person or class of 
5. 247 Cal. App.2d 40, 55 Cal. Rptr. 6. 247 Cal. App.2d at 49, 55 Cal. 
205 (1966). Rptr. at 211 (emphasis added). 
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persons to whom the duty was owed, the nature of the risk 
created by the actor's conduct and whether the harm that 
resulted was within the risk created. 
The most significant of these decisions is that of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Limited.7 
The plaintiff, a minor child, ran across the street to buy a 
doughnut from defendant's bakery truck and was injured by 
a passing motorist. Defendant claimed insulation from any 
negligence on its part on the theory that the act of the passing 
motorist was the proximate cause of the injury. The court 
refused to get into the semantic difficulties of proximate 
cause. It viewed the problem "as one of determining the 
nature of the duty and the scope of the risk of the negligent 
conduct"S and cited with approval from Harper and James: 
In a concrete situation an act or omission is negligent 
because it carries an undue threat of harm from some 
more or less specific kind of risk. [A] profes-
sional generation ago the 'cause' reasoning was used 
almost exclusively. But the problem is not one of cause 
in any meaningful sense and the scope of the risk analysis 
has been gaining favor in recent years with both courts 
and commentators.9 
This clear expression of the distinction between finding the 
defendant's conduct factually connected with plaintiff's in-
jury and determining that the defendant is legally responsible 
for the consequence may serve to lead lower courts and 
counsel into a more accurate use of cause in fact and proxi-
mate cause. But even more significant is the approach taken 
by treating what has traditionally been regarded as "proxi-
mate cause" as a problem of duty and not of cause. By so 
doing, the issue becomes one of law for the court to declare 
and not one of fact for the speculation of the jury. As applied 
to the Helms situation, once the court had determined that 
the itinerant street vendor owed a duty of care towards the 
7. 67 Cal.2d 228, 60 Cal. Rptr. 510, 9. 67 Ca1.2d at 236 n. 9, 60 Cal. 
430 P.2d 68 (1967). Rptr. at 516 n. 9, 430 P.2d at 74 n. 9. 
8. 67 Cal.2d at -, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 
516,430 P.2d at 74. 
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prospective purchaser, and this duty encompassed the duty 
of protection against the perils of traffic, then the jury role 
on this issue is limited to determining whether the vendor 
used reasonable care under the circumstances. 
Equally perceptive analyses of the issue of proximate cause 
appear in Custodio v. BauerlO and Fuller v. Standard Stations, 
Inc. 11 In Custodio, as discussed above, plaintiffs, husband 
and wife, sued for medical malpractice when a sterilization 
operation, performed on the wife by the defendants, did not 
produce the desired result. Defendants contended that the 
"damage, if any, suffered by plaintiffs, or either of them, were 
not the proximate result of any breach of duty on their part 
because of the intervening sexual relations between the par-
ents."12 The court's answer was brief: 
The general test of whether an independent interven-
ing act, which actively operates to produce an injury, 
breaks the chain of causation is the foreseeability of that 
act. It is difficult to conceive how the very 
act the consequences of which the operation was de-
signed to forestall, can be considered unforeseeable.13 
In Fuller v. Standard Stations, Inc., the issue was the liabil-
ity of a vendor of gasoline to an intoxicated motorist who 
subsequently seriously injured plaintiff. The opinion contains 
an excellent analysis of the problem: 
Current judicial analysis considers the outer bounda-
ries of negligence liability in terms of duty of care rather 
than proximate causation. The imposition of a duty 
of care and its extension to the expectable conduct of 
third persons is largely a question of law for the court. 
Where existence of a duty is brought into question, its 
affirmation rests in part upon social policy factors, in 
part upon an inquiry whether the actor's conduct in-
volves a foreseeable risk to persons in the plaintiff's 
situation. [Cites] In the consideration of a general 
10. 251 Cal. App.2d 303, 59 Cal. 
Rptr. 463 (1967). 
11. 250 Cal. App.2d 687, 58 Cal. 
Rptr. 792 (1967). 
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demurrer or motion for nonsuit in a negligence action, 
the dispositive issue is usually the legal question of duty, 
not the fact question of proximate cause. [Cites] This 
Court observed in Raymond v. Paradise Unified School 
Dist., supra (p. 6) [218 Cal. App.2d -, 31 Ca1.Rptr. 
p. 850]: Divergent results are possible and judicial 
disagreements arise by approaching negligence determi-
nations through the gateway of duty, on the one hand, 
or proximate causation on the other. 
When the facts at hand are approached as a duty of 
care problem, there may be justification for a rule impos-
ing liability on a service station operator who sells gaso-
line to a recognizably intoxicated motorist. The opera-
tor is negligent as to persons beyond his vision when his 
conduct creates a recognizable risk of harm to them. 
[Cites] The element of foreseeability offers no problem. 
There is no freak accident here, no extraordinary combi-
nation of events culminating in an unforeseeable injury. 
[Cites] Supplying motive power to a drunk driver in-
volves a recognizable, indeed obvious, danger to other 
motorists and pedestrians. The assumption of foresee-
ability for pleading purposes does not prevent the de-
fendant from presenting evidence that it did not know 
or have reason to believe that the customer was drunk 
and that it acted as a reasonably prudent person. Given 
the foreseeability of harm to the injured plaintiff, the 
inquiry then centers on the array of policy factors which 
justify affirmation or denial of the duty.14 
Duty to Whom and Nature of Risk 
The decisions just discussed are clearing the way for more 
accurate analysis of the problems involved. By avoiding the 
proximate cause approach, discussion of "duty" and "risk to 
whom" supplant the question-begging technique of leaving it 
all up to the jury. Accordingly, further consideration must 
be given some of the decisions just mentioned, as well as 
14. 250 Cal. App.2d at 691-692, 58 
Cal. Rptr. at 794-795. 
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others not previously discussed, for their analysis of the scope 
of duty and the extent of risk created by a breach of duty. 
In Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Limited/5 the plaintiff, a four-
year-old child, was struck by a passing motorist when the 
child ran across a street to purchase a doughnut from defend-
ant's sales truck. The driver of the truck operated a retail 
route, selling pastries in residential areas. The plaintiff had 
approached the truck a few minutes before the accident, to 
ask the driver to wait while he went home for some money. 
The driver knew where the child lived and told him that he 
would meet him later, up the street. 
While the truck was parked near plaintiff's house, but on 
the opposite side of the street, the child ran out from behind 
a parked car and was hit. The defendant noticed the child 
about to run out into the street, but before he could call out 
a warning the accident had occurred. At the trial, defendant's 
motion for nonsuit was granted. The supreme court reversed. 
The precise question of a street vendor's liability for in-
juries sustained by a minor patron from surrounding traffic 
had not been previously decided in California, although sev-
eral other jurisdictions have dealt with the problem.I6 The 
elements common to these cases are: ( 1) a defendant vendor 
who conducts his business in the streets; (2) a product that 
appeals to children and a dispensing vehicle that is intended 
to attract children by means of bells, whistles or distinctive 
coloring; and (3) a plaintiff injured by a third party while 
approaching or leaving defendant's vehicle. 
The supreme court held that there were two bases on which 
defendants owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. The first was 
that in undertaking to direct the child by arranging a future 
rendezvous the defendant driver entered into a legal relation-
ship with him, thereby voluntarily assuming a duty of reason-
able care toward him.I7 
15. 67 CaI.2d 228, 60 Cal. Rptr. 510, 
430 P.2d 68 (1967). 
16. See 74 A.L.R.2d 1050 for a dis-
cussion of the cases and authorities. 
17. See Prosser, TORTS, 3d ed., § 54, 
at 339-343. Liability predicated on a 
184 CAL LAW 1967 
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cept. In view of the element of express 
direction present in this case, liability 
based on this ground seems clear. 
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But the typical street-vendor situation involves no such 
direct control, and it is the second basis of liability suggested 
by the court that will probably prove more significant in future 
cases. By soliciting plaintiff's business, said the court, defend-
ant entered into an invitor-invitee relationship with him and 
as such, the invitor owed a duty to the plaintiff to exercise 
reasonable care for his safety while on the "premises." The 
"premises" or area of invitation was said to be greater than 
the defendant's immediate property and to include the street 
and immediate environs over which the invitee might pass. IS 
While basing liability on assumption of duty or solicitation, 
the supreme court also cited with approval and discussed three 
cases from other jurisdictions19 which, although reaching the 
same result, had based liability on much broader grounds of 
public policy and the duty owed children in general. It seems 
significant that the element of direct control and solicitation 
present in the Schwartz case are not apparent in the three 
cases cited, but rather, the tenor of these decisions seems to 
be that: "The responsibility of one who knowingly provokes 
into action the natural recklessness of irresponsible children 
ought surely be proportionate to the degree of danger he there-
by creates."20 
In Fuller v. Standard Stations, Inc./ plaintiffs sought to 
recover when injured by the negligence of an intoxicated 
motorist to whom defendant had sold gasoline. Heretofore, 
this problem has usually arisen with dram shops or bars 
who sold to an intoxicated person. Earlier California cases 
had refused to impose liability on the dram shop operator, 
holding that no common-law duty could be imposed to exer-
cise care to avoid harm to such remote plaintiffs,2 and sug-
18. The court cited Kopfinger v. 
Grand Central Public Market, 60 Cal.2d 
852, 37 Cal. Rptr. 65, 389 P.2d 529 
(1964) and Ross v. Kirby, 251 Cal. App. 
2d 267, 59 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1967); 
see also Prosser, TORTS, 3d ed., § 61 at 
401-()S. ct. the discussion, infra, of 
Ross v. Kirby. 
19. Landers v. French's Ice Cream 
Co., 98 Ga. App. 317, 106 S.E.2d 325, 
74 A.L.R.2d 1050 (1958); Mackey v. 
Spradlin, 397 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. App., 
1965); Jacobs v. Draper, 274 Minn. 110, 
142 N.W.2d 628 (1966). 
20. Mackey v. Spradlin, 397 S.W.2d 
at 37 (Ky. App., 1965). 
1. 250 Cal. App.2d 687, 58 Cal. Rptr. 
792 (1967). 
2. See cases cited in Fuller, 250 Cal. 
App.2d 687, 58 Cal. Rptr. 792 et seq. 
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gested that relief, if any were to be afforded, was a matter 
for the legislature. Fuller is a case of first impression in Cali-
fornia on the sale of gasoline to an intoxicated motorist.3 
The court was unable to distinguish it from the earlier dram 
shop cases and bowed, it seemed a bit reluctantly, to precedent 
and held that plaintiffs had not stated a cause of action against 
defendant. The opinion's analysis of the problem was a 
perceptive one. By approaching the issue as a problem of 
duty and nature of risk created, it avoided the pitfalls of 
proximate cause. The act of selling gasoline to an obviously 
intoxicated motorist, said the court, created a foreseeable 
risk of harm to other persons situated as plaintiffs were. 
Whether there might be policy considerations militating 
against the imposition of responsibility was not considered, 
since the court regarded the ultimate issue foreclosed by the 
earlier supreme court decisions in the dram shop cases. The 
entire opinion seemed to be an open invitation to the supreme 
court to grant a hearing and reconsider the matter; the invi-
tation was not accepted and we must assume that the issue 
of liability for such sales, whether by service stations or liquor 
establishments, is currently foreclosed unless and until the 
law is changed by the legislature. 
Mallow v. Tucker, Sadler & Bennett,4 involved a more tra-
ditional form of the "duty to whom" problem. A firm of 
architects had prepared plans and specifications for an exca-
vation and failed to delineate the presence of an underground 
high-voltage line. A workman on the job was electrocuted 
when he came into contact with the line. The evidence sup-
ported the conclusion that the defendants had not exercised 
due care in the preparation of the plans and specifications. 
It was held that their duty to do so extended to decedent 
as a person who "foreseeably and with reasonable certainty 
may be injured"5 as a result. 
3. Ct. Gonzalez v. Derrington, 56 4. 245 Cal. App.2d 700, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
Ca1.2d 130, 14 Cal. Rptr. 1, 363 P.2d 1 174 (1967). 
(1961), sale of gasoline in violation of a 5. 245 Cal. App.2d at 703, 54 Cal. 
municipal ordinance to persons who Rptr. at 176. 
used it to set a fire resulting in injury 
to one person aIJd death to three others. 
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FlnaIiy, attention is called to Burgess v. Conejo Valley 
Development Company,6 pending in the supreme court on 
grant of hearing after decision by the Court of Appeal for 
the Second District. Its potential impact, economically as 
well as on legal concepts, is great. It involves a suit brought 
by home owners in a tract against the developers and the 
lending institution which financed the developers, for damages 
arising out of the alleged faulty construction by the devel-
opers. The gravamen of the action was the existence of a 
duty on the part of the lending institution to exercise reason-
able care for the protection of the purchasers, with respect 
to financing and controlling the developers. Since the case 
is now under consideration, further comment would be im-
proper. 
The Guest Law 
Three cases demonstrated the weaknesses and inadequacies 
of California's Guest Law. So far as pertinent to this dis-
cussion, that act applies to any person "who as a guest accepts 
a ride in any vehicle upon a highway" and is injured "during 
the ride."7 
In O'Donnell v. Mullaney,S the parties were attending a 
picnic. Part of the trip was on a public road and part on a 
private road. The passenger was killed while the car was 
being operated on the private road. The supreme court 
unanimously held that the Guest Law did not apply since 
"highway" means "public roadway." 
In Trigg v. Smith9 and Campbell v. Adams,lO the courts of 
appeal were confronted with cases of injuries to passengers 
incurred while they were in the process of alighting from the 
vehicle at the end of the journey. In Trigg, the passenger was 
moving across the front seat in order to get out on the driver's 
6. The Court of Appeal's opinion was 
reported in 253 A.C.A. 186, 61 Cal. 
Rptr. 333 (1967); the supreme court 
granted a hearing on 10/5/67; the case 
was on the calendar for oral argument 
in April 1968. 
7. Cal. Vehicle Code § 17158 (em-
phasis added). 
8. 66 Cal. 2d 994, 59 Cal. Rptr. 840, 
429 P.2d 160 (1967). 
9. 246 Cal. App.2d 510, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
858 (1966). 
10. 250 Cal. App.2d 756, 59 Cal. 
Rptr. 63 (1967). 
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side; in Campbell, the passenger had opened the door and 
had one foot outside the car. Trigg was held to be a guest as 
a matter of law. Campbell's status was held to be a question 
of fact for the jury. 
There is no point in reviewing the O'Donnell decision on 
the issues of statutory construction involved, or the Trigg 
and Campbell cases and their predecessorsll on the matter of 
the precise point in space or time when the "ride" ends and 
the "passenger" is no longer a "guest." The short answer is 
that it is difficult to find any rational basis for these distinc-
tions.12 Every rationale13 invoked for the justification of a 
guest statute is applicable to the passenger who is injured 
on a private road leading to a picnic area, or on the grounds 
of a supermarket, motel or summer resort, or even in the 
owner's private driveway. If a literal reading of the statute 
requires differences in result when such differences cannot be 
justified, the statute needs amendment. And similarly, if 
"during the ride" is going to produce hair-splitting distinctions 
based on whether the motor is running, or more of the pas-
senger's body is outside, rather than inside, the vehicle,14 
or whether the parties might reasonably consider the journey 
at an end,15 some better language should be found to describe 
the temporal and spatial limits of the guest statute. 
11. See cases cited in Trigg, 246 Cal. 
App.2d at 513-514, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 
861 and in Campbell, 250 Cal. App.2d 
at 759-763, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 66-68. 
12. Unless it be the apparent antip-
athy of the courts to guest statutes and 
their determination to limit them by ap-
plication of the doctrine of strict con-
struction; see Prager v. Israel, 15 Cal.2d 
at 93, 98 P.2d at 731 (1940), quoted 
with approval in O'Donnell v. Mullaney, 
66 Cal.2d at 997, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 842, 
429 P.2d at 162. 
13. For an exposition of the standard 
rationales of possible collusion between 
passenger and driver, and of ingratitude 
188 CAI.I.AW 1967 
for hospitality, see Harper and James, 
The Law of Torts, § 16.15 at 961. 
14. Note particularly the court's re-
view of the evidence in Campbell v. 
Adams, 250 Cal. App.2d at 764, 59 Cal. 
Rptr. at 69: "The record discloses that 
plaintiff testified that at the time of the 
accident about one-half of the left side 
of his seat and leg remained in the car, 
that more of his body was out of the 
car than inside it, and that his right 
foot was on the ground with most of 
the weight of his body upon that foot." 
15. Campbell v. Adams, 250 Cal. 
App.2d at 765-766, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 70. 
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Poncher v. Brackett16 involved a suit against the grand-
parents of a minor child for injuries inflicted by the child.17 
The complaint alleged the dangerous propensities of the child, 
knowledge thereof by the defendants, and failure on their 
part adequately to control or supervise the child. Prior 
decisions18 had sustained the parents' liability in such circum-
stances, but this is apparently the first case in California to 
consider the responsibility of a more remote relative. The 
trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend. 
On appeal from the ensuing judgment of dismissal, the appel-
late court reversed, holding that one count in the complaint, 
which alleged that defendants "voluntarily and gratuitously 
assumed and accepted custody and control,,19 of the minor, 
stated a cause of action. As the court viewed it, "The ability 
to control the child, rather than the relationship as such, is 
the basis for a finding of liabilitY,,,20 whether the defendant 
be parent, more remote kin or, apparently, no kin at alP 
Hamilton v. Dick2 is another case of first impression. It 
involved the termination of the liability imposed by Vehicle 
Code section 177073 on the parent who had signed a minor's 
application for a driver's license. Vehicle Code section 17711 
16. 246 Cal. App.2d 769, 55 Cal. 
Rptr. 59 (1966). 
17. We anticipate the criticism that 
this is not true vicarious liability and 
that defendants are being held for their 
own fault. We agree; the case appears 
in this subsection for convenience. 
18. See particularly ElIis v. D'Angelo, 
116 Cal. App.2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 
(1953). 
19. 246 Cal. App.2d at 770 n. 1, 55 
Cal. Rptr. at 60 n. 1. 
20. 246 Cal. App.2d at 772, 55 Cal. 
Rptr. at 61. 
1. In this respect, it is significant that 
the court relied on RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 319 which is applica-
ble (0 "one who takes charge" and not 
Oll § 316, dealing with parental duty. 
2. 254 Cal. App.2d 131, 61 Cal. Rptr. 
894 (1967). 
3. § 17707 of the Vehicle Code pro-
vides: "Any civil liability of a minor 
arising out of his driving a motor vehi-
cle upon a highway during his minority 
is hereby imposed upon the person who 
signed and verified the application of 
the minor for a license and the person 
shalI be jointly and severalIy liable with 
the minor for any damages proximately 
resulting from the negligence or willful 
misconduct of the minor in driving a 
motor vehicle, . . ." (254 Cal. App. 
2d at 132 n. 1, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 895 n. 1). 
A minor substitution of terms was made 
in this section in 1967. It did not, how-
ever, affect the substance of the section. 
See Cal. Slats. 1967, ch. 702, § 9. 
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provides that the signer may be relieved from such liability 
by applying for and actually obtaining cancellation of the 
minor's license by the Department of Motor Vehicles. In 
the instant case, the defendant had not applied for cancella-
tion, but the Department, on its own initiative, had revoked 
the minor's license for a series of vehicle offenses. Such revo-
cation, it was held, had effectively terminated the minor's driv-
ing privileges and this in turn terminated the signer's liability 
without his being required to apply for a cancellation under 
section 17711. One word of caution is in order; this limita-
tion is expressly restricted to a total revocation of the minor's 
license and a suspension or other restriction limited in time 
will not absolve the signer from liability even though the 
driving takes place during the period of suspension. 
Assumption of Risk and Contributory Fault 
Grey v. Fibreboard Paper Products Co.4 considered the 
perennial problem of the admixture of the defenses of assump-
tion of risk and contributory fault. Plaintiff, a machinist, was 
repairing a paper cutting machine in defendant's plant while 
the machine was in operation. He was injured when his hand 
was caught in the moving rollers. The case was tried before 
the court, sitting with a jury, and verdict was for plaintiff. 
Both parties had requested instructions on contributory and 
assumption of risk. The court instructed on contributory 
fault, but not on assumption of risk. 
The supreme court held that the evidence was sufficient 
to permit a finding of assumption of risk and therefore the 
requested instructions should have been given. However, the 
failure so to instruct was found not to be prejudicial, since 
"the 'assumption of risk' here involved is but a variant of 
contributory negligence. ."5 To reach this result, the 
court apparently assumed that assumption of risk would be 
applicable to plaintiff if, and only if, he were found to have 
unreasonably proceeded in a situation where he knew or 
should have known and appreciated the risk involved. But 
4. 65 Cal.2d 240, 53 Cal. Rptr. 545, 5. 65 Cal.2d at 246, 53 Cal. Rptr. 
418 P.2d 153 (1966). at 548, 418 P.2d at 156. 
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traditionally, assumption of risk has included conduct that 
was reasonable under the circumstances, conduct that a rea-
sonably prudent person, considerate of his own affairs, and 
with full knowledge of the situation and its alternatives, might 
engage in.6 Plaintiff was a man with thirty years' experience 
in working on heavy machinery of this type. Part of the 
repairs consisted in smoothing the rollers by holding an emery 
cloth against them while they were in operation. Plaintiff 
declined the assistance of one of defendant's employees (who 
could have stood by to stop the machinery, if necessary), 
saying that the job could be better performed by one man. 
Under these circumstances, it would appear that plaintiff 
acted reasonably, but it would also appear that he acted with 
full knowledge of the risk and the other choices available 
to him. Under past formulations, this would seem to present 
a case of assumption of risk, and not contributory faule 
The entire opinion leaves the reader in doubt whether the 
supreme court has (1) abandoned the traditional view of 
assumption of risk; (2) decided the traditional view could 
not apply under the particular facts of the case; or (3) simply 
concluded that if a jury did not find for defendant on contrib-
utory fault, it would not have found for it on assumption of 
risk. Until there is further word from the supreme court on 
assumption of risk and its relation to contributory fault, 
one should proceed with caution in citing the Grey case. 
Owners and Occupiers of Land 
The year under review was memorable; there were no 
"attractive nuisance" cases8 and the decisions involving owners 
and occupiers of land were few, with only two meriting 
passing notice. 
In Anderson v. Anderson/ the trial court had granted a 
nonsuit on plaintiff's opening statement. That statement was 
6. See PROSSER ON TORTS, 3d ed., analogy; see Schwartz v. Helms Bakery 
§ 67 at 451. Limited, 67 Cal.2d 228, 60 Cal. Rptr. 
7. See PROSSER ON TORTS, 3d ed., 510, 430 P.2d 68 (1967), discussed 
§ 67 at 451. supra. 
8. The term appears to have been 9. 251 Cal. App.2d 409,59 Cal. Rptr. 
used in only one case, and then only by 342 (1967). 
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to the effect that plaintiff visited defendant's home, at the 
latter's invitation, to use the swimming pool. The pool had 
been constructed by defendant and had a submerged ledge, 
the existence of which was not known to plaintiff and was 
not readily visible from the surface. Plaintiff was not warned 
of the ledge, and was seriously injured when he dove into 
the pool. The Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed, 
holding that the opening statement stated a case of possible 
liability. The opinion sets forth an extremely narrow basis 
for liability, although the fact situation would clearly bring 
the case within the rule of section 342 of the Restatement of 
Torts.10 The court referred to earlier decisions and ques-
tioned whether the rule of section 342 was law in California. 
It concluded that "a determination of this appeal does not 
require the application of the bald declaration of the Restate-
ment rule."ll The court considered plaintiff's argument that 
the submerged ledge was a "trap," but decided that the theory 
of a "trap" was limited to spring guns, steel traps, and the like 
deliberately set by the landowner, and concluded: "The lack 
of definiteness in the application of the term to any other situa-
tion makes its use argumentative and unsatisfactory. We 
shall not engage in argument as to whether the condition 
of the swimming pool constituted a trap. "12 The court dis-
posed of the claim of defendant's "active negligence" by 
limiting that concept to activity after plaintiff's arrival. 
Liability was predicated, however, on a duty to warn the 
plaintiff, under the particular circumstances set forth in the 
opening statement. Those circumstances, as set forth in the 
to. The court quoted § 342 of the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS as 
follows: "A possessor of land is subject 
to liability for bodily harm caused to 
gratuitous licensees by a natural or 
artificial condition thereon if, but only 
if, he 
"(a) knows of the condition and real-
izes that it involves an unreasonable risk 
to them and has reason to believe that 
they will not discover the condition or 
realize the risk, and 
"(b) invites or permits them to enter 
192 CAL LAW 1967 
or remain upon the land, without exer-
cising reasonable care 
"(i) to make the condition reasonably 
safe, or 
"(i/) to warn them of the condition 
and the risk involved therein." (251 
Cal. App.2d at 411-412, 59 Cal. Rptr. 
at 344). 
11. 251 Cal. App.2d at 412, 59 Cal. 
Rptr. at 344 (emphasis added). 
12. 251 Cal. App.2d at 412, 59 Cal. 
Rptr. at 344. 
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OpInIOn, were that: the owner created or maintained the 
dangerous condition; the invitation was extended to the spe-
cific use of the part of the land on which the condition existed; 
the presence of the dangerous condition was not apparent 
because of conditions brought about by the occupier of the 
land; and the hazard was encountered while making use of 
the land for the specific purpose intended.13 
As thus stated, the distinctions between the court's formu-
lation and the Restatement may be subtle, but they are 
significant in three respects. First, the owner must create 
or maintain the hazardous condition; apparently there would 
be no liability for a natural condition without some affirma-
tive action equivalent to "maintaining.,,14 Next, the owner 
must invite use of that specific portion of the premises on 
which the hazard exists and for the purpose made dangerous 
thereby; a general invitation does not suffice. Finally, be-
cause of the owner's activity, the hazard must not be apparent; 
a hazard which is not apparent because of natural conditions 
not brought about by the owner does not subject him to 
liability. 
The law has long been plagued by ultra-fine distinctions 
in the matter of the duty owed by owners and occupiers of 
land, both to persons on the premises and those using an 
adjacent way. The tendency to formulate rules in terms of 
refinements of the duty owed rather than in terms of a simple 
duty to act as a reasonable prudent person under the circum-
stancesI5 has multiplied distinctions. The present case with 
its refinements on the refinements of the Restatement rule 
seems an unfortunate further proliferation of such distinctions. 
In Ross v. Kirby/6 the duty owed by a landowner to a 
business invitee was held to extend to abutting city property, 
a public parking lot, used by defendants' patrons for parking 
and easy access to defendants' premises. The scope of the 
13. 251 Cal. App.2d at 413, 59 Cal. 
Rptr. at 345. 
14. See King v. Lennen, 53 Cal.2d 
340, 1 Cal. Rptr. 665, 348 P.2d 98 
(1959); Prosser, Trespassing Children, 
47 Cal. L. Rev. 427, 466 (1959). 
13 
15. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Gen-
erale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 3 
L.Ed.2d 550, 79 S.Ct. 406 (1959). 
16. 251 Cal. App.2d 267, 59 Cal. 
Rptr. 601 (1967). 
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decision is unclear and leaves open for conjecture and future 
development several possibilities. The hazard was a "berm" 
or ledge, constructed by the city on the edge of the parking 
lot, but on the city's side of the dividing line. It had originally 
been painted white to enhance its visibility, but after approxi-
mately six months the paint had worn off, inferentially, said 
the court, from the foot traffic to and from defendants' prem-
ises. Two cases, Kopfinger v. Grand Central Public Market17 
and Johnston v. De La Guerra Properties, Inc.,t8 were cited 
to support the decision. However neither would seem to 
justify the decision. In Kopfinger, a patron of a market 
slipped on debris on the sidewalk; that debris had resulted 
from defendant's use of the sidewalk for meat deliveries to its 
market. In Johnston, the occupier of the land had affirma-
tively acted to assume and exercise control over the area 
outside the premises on which the hazard existed. The most 
that can be said, with respect to the activities of defendants 
in Ross v. Kirby, was that their back door faced on the park-
ing lot, an awning extended almost the entire distance from 
the back door to the property line and thus an invitation was 
extended to patrons to enter from the parking lot. 
The opinion leaves several questions unsettled. First is 
the court's indication that defendants should have painted the 
berm or otherwise acted to increase its visibility. But does 
a property owner have a right, let alone a duty, to enter on 
adjacent city property and maintain it? And would the same 
suggestion have been made if the city had not originally 
painted the berm? 
Secondly, there is the broader question of how far the 
court will extend a duty to maintain an adjacent public park-
ing lot. Is this decision predicated on the fact that the berm 
was on the dividing line and may have been designed to protect 
defendants' property from water drainage?19 Would the same 
doctrine be applied to low barriers within the parking lot 
designed to keep cars in their respective lanes, or to an 
17. 60 Cal.2d 852, 37 Cal. Rptr. 65, 19. 251 Cal. App.2d at 270-271, 59 
389 P.2d 529 (1964). Cal. Rptr. at 604. 
18. 28 Cal.2d 394, 170 P.2d 5 (1946). 
194 CAL LAW 19~7 
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accumulation of oil resulting from cars parked by defendants' 
patrons? 
Strict Liability 
California courts have not been reluctant to impose strict 
liability on persons engaged in hazardous activities. 20 Smith 
v. Lockheed Propulsion Co. l adhered to that policy and held 
defendant liable for damages to plaintiff's structure caused 
by seismic vibrations from the static firing of a rocket motor. 
The court took the position that strict liability should be 
imposed, as a matter of policy, to allocate the risk of loss 
from a hazardous activity to the person who can administer 
the loss so that it will ultimately be borne by the pUblic. 
The court recognized that the doctrine does not automatically 
subject the actor to liability without regard to place or circum-
stances, but found that risk of harm to plaintiff's property 
should have been anticipated since defendant's property 
bordered plaintiff's on three sides. 
The court also considered defendant's claim for immunity, 
since the activity was pursuant to government contract. The 
court assumed that the United States would have been im-
mune, under the Dalehite2 decision, but held that the defend-
ant as contractor did not share that immunity.3 Two grounds 
were advanced for denying immunity. The first was that 
the selection of the test site, the construction of the installa-
tion and the manner of testing had not been specified by 
the government, but were left to the contractor. The second 
was that the court, following the Muskopj4 decision, regarded 
any extension of the doctrine of sovereign immunity as con-
trary to the existing policy of the State of California. Still 
20. The leading cases are Luthringer 
v. Moore, 31 Cal.2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 
(1948) and Green v. General Petroleum 
Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952, 60 
A.L.R. 475 (1928). 
1. 247 Cal. App.2d 774, 56 Cal. Rptr. 
128 (1967). 
2. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 
15, 97 L.Ed. 1427, 73 S.Ct. 956 (1953). 
3. "The question whether the contrac-
tor shares the immunity of the United 
States probably presents a federal ques-
tion. . . . Our research has failed to 
reveal any federal cases on this issue_ 
. . ." 247 Cal. App.2d at 787 n. 5, 
56 Cal. Rptr. at 139 n. 6. 
4. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 
55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 359 P. 
2d 457 (1961). 
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to be determined is whether the United States Government, 
either as a matter of inherent federal supremacy or as a 
matter of contractual or legislative policy, will assert a claim 
of immunity on behalf of its contractors in similar cases. 
Emotional Distress-Negligent and Intentional 
Two cases considered significant aspects of the right to 
recover for the infliction of emotional distress or disturbance; 
neither is a wholly satisfactory resolution of the problem 
presented. 
In Vanoni v. Western Airlines,5 the claim was for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. The basis of plaintiff's com-
plaint was the negligent operation by defendant of an air-
plane, causing plaintiffs as passengers to believe there was 
mechanical trouble which might cause the plane to crash. 
Each plaintiff alleged that, as a result, he sustained "grievous 
mental suffering, anguish and anxiety and suffered severe 
shock to his nerves and nervous system and suffered other 
In]uries. ."6 The trial court entered judgment of dis-
missal after sustaining a general demurrer without leave to 
amend. The court of appeal reversed, holding the complaint 
stated a cause of action. 
The decision recognized that Amaya v. Home Ice7 had 
established the "no impact" rule in California, permitting 
recovery for fright or shock due to defendant's negligent 
conduct, without the necessity of establishing a physical 
impact on plaintiff. But the court then concluded that in 
cases of negligent8 conduct "there can be no recovery for 
emotional distress or mental suffering unaccompanied by phys-
ical harm.,,9 However, in the instant case, the court stated 
5. 247 Cal. App.2d 793, 56 Cal. Rptr. 
115 (1967). 
6. 247 Cal. App.2d at 794, 56 Cal. 
Rptr. at 116. 
7. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Sup-
ply Co., 59 Cal.2d 295, 29 Cal. Rptr. 
33, 379 P.2d 513 (1963). 
8. Ct. on intentional infliction of 
emotional disturbance, State Rubbish 
196 CAL LAW 1967 
Collectors Assoc. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 
330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952), indicating re-
covery may be had without proof of 
physical harm, but nonetheless noting 
that the injured party had suffered nau-
sea as well as fright. 
9. 247 Cal. App.2d at 795, 56 Cal. 
Rptr. at 116. 
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that such physical harm had been adequately alleged, and 
quoted from Sloane v. Southern California Ry., decided in 
1896, to the effect "that a nervous shock or paroxysm, or a 
disturbance of the nervous system, is distinct from mental 
anguish, and falls within the physiological, rather than the 
psychological, branch of the human organism."lo 
It is rather surprising to find a court relying on the judiciary 
rather than the medical profession, and more particularly, 
in view of the growth of medical knowledge in recent times, 
on a decision rendered in 1896, for the determination of 
what are physiological and what are psychological disturb-
ances of the human organism. Furthermore, it is extremely 
questionable whether the purported distinction is at all mean-
ingful. It is generally accepted medical knowledge that every 
emotional disturbance has some physiological effectsll and, 
conversely, many physiological effects may be due primarily 
to emotional disturbances.12 To suggest that there is some 
clear line of demarcation between the two, or between nervous 
disturbances and emotional disturbances, is to inject into the 
law a dichotomy without a scientific foundation. In addition, 
taking the opinion as written, all that is required is that 
pleader and witnesses be cautious in their choice of words 
so that some scintilla of physical harm is pleaded and proven.13 
Finally, one well may ask whether, if this distinction is to 
followed, any purpose is served by a legal doctrine that 
seeks to dichotomize between physiological and psychological 
injuries, between an injury to the body and an injury to the 
emotional system (whatever that may be), and denies recov-
ery for the latter. 
The other case in this area was Spackman v. Good,14 a suit 
for intentional infliction of emotional disturbance. The suit 
10. 111 Cal. at 680, 44 P. at 322 
(1896). 
11. See, generally, Dunbar, EMO-
~_ TIONS AND BODILY CHANGES (4th ed. 
1954), and C. Wahl, NEW DIMENSIONS 
IN PSYCHOSOMATIC MEDICINE (1964). 
12. See, generally, C. Best, and N. 
Taylor, THE PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF 
MEDICAL PRACTICE (7th ed. 1961); and 
T. Harrison, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL 
MEDICINE (5th ed. 1966). 
13. As witness the statement in the 
Siliznofj opinion, that the aggrieved par-
ty "because of the fright . . . be-
came ill and vomited several times." 
(38 Cal.2d at 335, 240 P.2d at 284.) 
14. 245 Cal. App.2d 518, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. 78 (1966). 
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was brought by the guardian of two minor children, based 
on the alleged outrageous conduct of defendant towards the 
children resulting in their becoming psychopathic. The con-
duct involved was narrated over several pages of the court's 
opinion; it cannot even be summarized without unduly ex-
tending the discussion. Suffice to say, it consisted of a course 
of conduct on defendant's part that led to his plea of guilty 
on the charge of contributing to the delinquency of one of 
the plaintiffs and to his subsequent commitment for observa-
tion as a sexual psychopath. The trial resulted in a verdict 
for the plaintiffs. On appeal from the judgment on the verdict, 
the court of appeal reversed, with directions to enter judgment 
for the defendant on the grounds that: 
The evidence is not sufficient to establish defendant's 
misconduct was the cause of plaintiffs' mental state, that 
defendant acted with intent to cause this condition, or 
that his action was of such a nature he should have 
anticipated it was likely to cause that condition. In 
light of these conclusions, the order denying defendant's 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was 
error.15 
The result, as thus stated, presents several distinct prob-
lems; first is the defendant's "intent." Here it seems the 
court applied an erroneous test. Even if the defendant did 
not act with the intent of causing plaintiff to become a psycho-
pathic personality, it seems clear that any adult would have 
realized that conduct of the type described in the court's 
opinion was "substantially certain"16 to cause serious emo-
tional distress or disturbance to either a fifteen-year-old girl 
or a thirteen-year-old boy, and the substantial certainty test 
satisfies the intent requirement.17 
15. 245 Cal. App.2d at 534, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. at 88. 
16. "The word 'intent' is used through-
out the Restatement of this Subject to 
denote that the actor desires to cause 
consequences of his act, or that he be-
lieves that the consequences are sub-
198 CAL LAW 1967 
stantially certain to result from it." RE-
STATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) § 8A. 
17. The opinion, in n. 4, 245 Cal. 
App.2d at 530, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 85, re-
fers to various substitutes for "intent" 
such as reckless or wilful disregard of 
the consequences, knowledge by a rea-
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Second is the matter of causation. Here it seems the court 
placed an impossible burden on plaintiffs. There was evi-
dence by a psychiatrist and a psychologist that plaintiffs were 
emotionally disturbed and had sustained what was termed 
"sex trauma" during a period of time that coincided with 
defendant's activities. There were other forces operative 
during the same period, including a contested divorce between 
the plaintiffs' parents. The court concluded, as a matter of 
law, that there was insufficient proof of causal connection, 
since plaintiffs' condition could have been produced by forces 
other than defendant's conduct. It is submitted that in this 
regard the court was in error. When two forces are operative, 
the actor who is responsible for one of those forces does not 
escape liability, if his conduct is sufficient to produce the 
result, merely by showing that another force might have 
produced the result. IS 
Finally, there is the question of the court's approach to 
the entire problem presented by the Spackman case. This 
was a case based on intentional and not negligent infliction 
of emotional disturbance and hence, even under the narrow 
limitations of prior decisions, recovery could be had for 
"psychological" or "psychopathic" injuries without proof of 
"physiological" harm. This the court recognized,19 but it 
seems to have nullified that recognition by its deep-seated 
sonable person that the result would fol-
low, and others. The court simply con-
cluded that the proven misconduct of 
defendant was not such as the actor 
would recognize as likely to cause emo-
tional distress or disturbance. But que-
ry, was this so clear that the court, as 
a matter of law, should override the 
jury verdict? 
18. C/. the historic case of Summers 
v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1, 5 
A.L.R.2d 91 (1948), holding both de-
fendants liable when they simultaneous-
ly fired shots, only one of which struck 
p:aintiff. A closely analogous case, Or-
ser v. Vierra, 252 Cal. App.2d -, 60 
Cal. Rptr. 708 (1967), applied the same 
reasoning when defendants were alter-
nately firing the same weapon and de-
cedent was killed at some time during 
the period of shooting. And finally a 
most interesting case on cause in fact, 
State of Maryland v. Manor Real Es-
tate, etc., 176 F.2d 414 (4th Cir. [1949]), 
where decedent contracted typhoid while 
a resident of a housing development and 
the presence of rats which might have 
been carriers of infected fleas which 
might have transmitted the disease was 
regarded as sufficient proof of causal 
connection. 
19. 245 Cal. App.2d at 528-529, 54 
Cal. Rptr. at 84-85. 
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scepticism with respect to proof of causal connection when 
"no organic injury was present.,,20 
The result is that although the paths followed are different, 
both courts were concerned with the distinction between the 
physical and psychological and were reluctant to permit recov-
ery for injuries to the personality as distinguished from in-
juries to the person. This, it is submitted, is the use of 
Nineteenth Century medical concepts in a Twentieth Century 
setting. 
Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process 
Meadows v. Bakersfield Savings & Loan Associationl was 
an action for abuse of process arising out of the alleged 
wrongful recordation of a notice of default and election to 
sell under a security deed of trust. No claim of slander of 
title was made. A nonsuit was granted and affirmed on 
appeal, the court holding that the notice in question did not 
constitute "process". The opinion stated: 
[T]he essence of the tort 'abuse of process' lies in 
the misuse of the power of the court; it is an act done 
in the name of the court and under its authority for the 
purpose of perpetrating an injustice. Since defendant 
took no action pursuant to authority of court, directly 
or by ancillary proceedings, no judicial process was 
abused . . . we find no case extending the definition 
of 'process' to a proceeding that in nowise emanates from 
or rests upon the authority or jurisdiction of a court.2 
This language once again raises the question of the scope 
of abuse of process in California. An earlier decision, Tran-
china v. Arcinas,3 allowed an action for abuse of process 
when the defendant, as lessor, had procured an eviction certif-
icate from the rent control authorities on the claim that he 
intended to occupy the premises himself, then brought evic-
tion proceedings, obtained a writ of possession and re-rented 
20. 245 Cal. App.2d at 528, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. at 84. 
1. 250 Cal. App.2d 749, 59 Cal. Rptr. 
34 (1967). 
200 CAL LAW 1967 
2. 250 Cal. App.2d at 753, 59 Cal. 
Rptr. at 37 (emphasis added). 
3. 78 Cal. App.2d 522, 178 P.2d 65 
(1947). 
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the premises at a higher rental. The opinion was carefully 
limited, holding that the process that was abused was the 
writ of possession and not the eviction certificate. 
It is submitted that this approach is unduly restrictive. 
The Restatement4 and the text writers5 speak of this tort as 
an abuse of legal process. And the process of the law would 
have been no less perverted in Trachina if the lessee had 
vacated, either after being served with the eviction certificate 
or after judgment in the action, without awaiting the issuing 
of a writ of possession. 
In the Meadows case, the recordation of the notice of 
breach and election to sell could have caused the loss of the 
legal title just as effectively as a mortgage foreclosure suit, 
or could have been used (as was alleged) to coerce plaintiff 
into paying more than plaintiff asserted was due. 
It may be that it is unnecessary, as the court suggests, 
to extend the action for abuse of process to the Meadows 
situation, since plaintiff could have been fully protected 
through an action for breach of contract. However, a broader 
question remains. This opinion, as have prior ones, by con-
tinuing to limit the action to the abuse of judicial process, 
precludes recovery for abuse of administrative process,6 and 
this limitation, it is suggested, is neither desirable nor neces-
sary. The present rule should be replaced by a doctrine 
allowing recovery for abuse of at least any legal process. 
Defamation 
When will a statement, clearly defamatory on its face, 
be limited by the circumstances surrounding its publication? 
This question was raised in Arno v. Stewart,7 where the 
plaintiff, an entertainer, was introduced on defendant's tele-
vision program as a member of the Mafia. The uncontra-
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 682. 
5. See, e.g., Harper & James, THE 
LAW OF TORTS, § 4.9 at 330, and par-
ticularly at 332. 
6. It should be noted that an action 
for the analogous tort of malicious pros-
ecution will lie when the proceedings 
are before an administrative agency; 
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 680; Harper & James, THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 4.10 at 332, 333. 
7. 245 Cal. App.2d 955,54 Cal. Rptr. 
392 (1966). 
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dieted evidence was that the statement was made in a friendly 
and joking manner. At the trial the plaintiff requested a 
jury instruction that would have established the defamatory 
nature of the statement as a matter of law. This was refused, 
and from an adverse judgment plaintiff appealed. 
The Court of Appeal of the First District (Division One) 
conceded that an unqualified accusation of membership in 
the Mafia would probably be defamatory on its face, either 
as imputing the commission of a crime or injuring plaintiff 
in his business or profession,8 but held that the statement 
could be qualified by the jocular manner in which it was 
uttered. 
The fact that a defamer intends his statement to be a joke 
will not necessarily shield him from liability; humor and 
ridicule are common vehicles for defamation.9 There must, 
however, be a defamatory meaning conveyed, and the question 
of humor is germane to the issue of whether the audience 
understood the statement to be in jest and therefore non-
defamatory.lo In judging the effect of a communication, the 
context and surrounding circumstances must be considered.ll 
These were held to be matters for the jury which could reason-
ably find this non-defamatory if the audience had recognized 
it as a joke. 
A second defamation case decided by the same court, 
Cameron v. Wernick,12 indicates the breadth of the definition 
of defamation and the extent to which it may include almost 
any language which, upon its face, has the tendency to injure 
a man's reputation, either generally or with respect to his 
occupation. 
The alleged defamation in the Cameron case appeared in 
a magazine article which attributed to plaintiff, an author, 
8. Cal. Civ. Code § 46; White v. Va-
lenta, 234 Cal. App.2d 243, 44 Cal. 
Rptr. 241, 13 A.L.R.3d 1271 (1965). 
9. Prosser, TORTS, 3d ed., §§ 106, 
759, 760. The classic case is that of 
the gentleman rider and the Camel cig-
arette ad: Burton v. Crowell Publishing 
Co., 82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936). 
202 CAL LAW 1967 
10. Prosser, TORTS, 3d ed., §§ 106, 
763, 764. 
11. See, e.g., Bettner v Holt, 70 Cal. 
270, 11 P. 713 (1886). 
12. 251 Cal. App.2d 890, 60 Cal. 
Rptr. 102 (1967). 
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the statement "I can't be the only man in this country with 
an eye for a fast buck"; and asserted that he reported one 
set of sales figures of his book to his collaborators while 
giving a different figure to the press. Defendant's demurrer 
was sustained at the trial. The court of appeal reversed, 
holding that both of the complained-of statements were 
capable of conveying a defamatory meaning. The phrase 
"eye for a fast buck" had uncomplimentary overtones, sug-
gestive of unscrupulous business practices, and the claimed 
disparity in the sales reports could reasonably be understood 
as charging plaintiff with dishonesty, either to the press or 
to his collaborators, and if to the latter, a further inference of 
dishonesty might reasonably be drawn. 
* 
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